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Introduction

Manon Tremblay

At the beginning of 2007, 17.2 percent of all members of the lower or single houses of some 190 national parliaments are women.¹ Thus, women's share of seats in parliament remains very much lower than that required for parity between the sexes. In fact, only two parliaments—those of Rwanda and Sweden—comprise almost an equal number of women and men. Although these countries clearly have very different cultural, socioeconomic, and political profiles, they have in common an important feature: proportional representation (PR) voting systems. For many years now, studies have identified the primary role that electoral systems play in ensuring a sizable proportion of women parliamentarians (Larserud and Taphorn 2007; Matland 2003; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Norris 1987: 123, 1997a, 2004: 187; Norris and Inglehart 2005; Paxton 1997; Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005: 60–61; Rule 1987, 1994a, 1994b; Rule and Norris 1992; Sawer 1997; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). However, things are rarely so simple. The Inter-Parliamentary Union's figures also show that many countries using PR systems achieve only modest proportions of female legislators and, moreover, that many such countries are outperformed by those with majoritarian systems. In addition, more and more scholars argue that previous studies may have exaggerated the extent to which voting systems² can promote or hinder the achievement of a substantial presence of women in parliaments. Salmond (2006), for example, contends that “previous work has overstated, by factors of between two and three, how much of a difference an electoral system can make” (175). The relative influence of voting systems on the election of women remains a significant area of debate in the field of women and politics and is the reason for this book.

The overarching objective of *Women and Legislative Representation: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Sex Quotas* is to examine the effects of voting systems on the proportion of women in national parliaments, while also taking into account the roles of other variables (cultural, socioeconomic, and political). To do this, it examines 15 countries, which are divided

1 among the three following electoral families: (1) plurality/majority systems:
2 First Past the Post (FPTP), Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV), Two-Round
3 System (TRS) and Alternative Vote (AV) System; (2) PR systems: Closed List
4 PR, Preferential (Open) List PR, and Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems;
5 and finally (3) Mixed-Member (MM) systems: Proportional (MMP),
6 Majoritarian with Partial Compensation, and Majoritarian (MMM) systems.
7 More specifically, *Women and Legislative Representation* pursues three sec-
8 ondary objectives. First, the work aims to assess and explore the contention
9 that PR systems favour women's entry into parliaments. This idea is widely
10 taken for granted in works studying the election of women in politics. A crit-
11 ical examination involves identifying and evaluating the validity of effects
12 that could create such a relationship, such as the hypothesis that closed lists
13 encourage the election of women. It also requires us to assess the corollary
14 argument that majority voting systems do not favour the election of women.
15 Second, *Women and Legislative Representation* aims to evaluate the role of
16 other variables—cultural, socioeconomic, and political—in women's elec-
17 tion to parliamentary seats, with particular attention to both political parties
18 and sex quotas. This secondary objective explores the idea that voting sys-
19 tems do not automatically determine the proportion of women in parlia-
20 ments, but they do contribute to determining it, albeit in combination with
21 other factors, notably political parties' demand for candidates and sex quotas.
22 If voting systems concern interparty competition (i.e., the conversion of
23 votes into seats in parliament and their allocation to the different parties), it
24 is the political parties that are responsible for the intraparty competition
25 (i.e., which candidates will sit in parliament). Further, when properly
26 designed and implemented, sex quotas (legal and party quotas) may play a
27 key role in the feminization of parliamentary arenas. The third and final
28 objective of the work is to present relevant case studies.

29 In the following sections of this introduction, I will first develop the con-
30 cept of representation and how it relates to voting systems. Second, I will
31 review relevant literature on the factors influencing women's legislative repre-
32 sentation, with special attention to electoral systems, political parties, and sex
33 quotas. Third, I will describe the analytical framework used by the contribu-
34 tors in their case studies. Finally, I will explain the rationale for the choice of
35 countries and outline the shared format in which all chapters are structured.

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Political Representation and Electoral Systems

39 In her book, which nearly four decades after its release is still an authority on
40 the subject, Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between four meanings of political
41 representation: symbolic representation, which embodies an idea or an
42 entity (e.g., a flag or a king represents the nation); formal representation,

1 which refers to institutional rules and procedures by which representatives
2 are designated (i.e., the electoral regulations and the voting system); descrip-
3 tive representation, which refers to the similarities and differences between
4 representatives and the represented; and substantive representation, which
5 evokes the activities of representation (and more specifically the responsive-
6 ness of representatives to the represented). The present study is firmly
7 anchored in the descriptive and formal conceptions of political representa-
8 tion, as they apply to women in parliamentary assemblies. It does not, there-
9 fore, attempt to examine what happens once women achieve access to
10 political arenas (women's substantive representation).

11 In terms of descriptive representation, a legislative assembly is said to be
12 representative if its makeup constitutes a miniaturized model or a micro-
13 cosm of society. Consequently, it is argued that women are equal citizens and
14 therefore should share, equally with men, public decision-making positions;
15 otherwise, there is a representation deficit. While this is not a new view of
16 representation, it has gathered momentum in recent years. If, historically, the
17 discussion of political representation excluded women, today it is impossible
18 to imagine it proceeding without addressing the political representation of
19 women. In fact, the proportion of women in parliament is increasingly per-
20 ceived as an indication of a state's quality of political representation.

21 Formal representation refers to the institutional rules and procedures
22 through which representatives are chosen. The voting system, as the primary
23 mechanism for this choice, is the process through which the will of the
24 people is converted into seats in parliament (Farrell 2001: 4; Gallagher
25 and Mitchell 2005a: 3). There are three basic types of electoral systems:
26 plurality/majority (or majoritarian) systems, PR systems, and mixed systems
27 (Massicotte and Blais 1999; Norris 2004: 41; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005: 27).
28 Each type of electoral system is based on a particular concept of political
29 representation. McLean (1991) suggests that voting systems be classified
30 according to the distinction between the "microcosm" and "principal-agent"
31 conceptions of representation. Lijphart (1984: 150) stresses the same point.
32 PR systems find their ideological justification in the "microcosm" conception
33 of representation. Such systems are intended to represent both the majority
34 and the minorities proportionally translating party votes into party seats in
35 parliament. Consequently, PR systems are those most likely to give rise to
36 multiparty arrangements. By contrast, majoritarian systems, which are based
37 on the "principal-agent" conception of representation, not only bestow victory
38 on the majority while ignoring minorities, but they also give further
39 power to the victorious party by accentuating its representation in parlia-
40 ment (to the detriment of other political groups). Such systems give rise to a
41 smaller and less diverse range of parties than do PR systems. This is, of
42 course, a general description; a closer look at the evidence reveals several

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1 nuances: some PR systems behave like majoritarian systems (in Hungary, for
2 instance), while some majoritarian systems do allow for minority represen-
3 tation (for example, in India, where representation is supported by a system
4 of reserved seats for members of depressed classes). Nevertheless, the general
5 pattern illustrates a persistent conflict between principles of universality and
6 particularity in political representation. Mixed systems, to borrow from the
7 title of a book by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a), are an attempt at bring-
8 ing together the best of both worlds, although some writers, such as Sartori
9 (1994), feel that they actually combine the weaknesses of the two contribut-
10 ing formulas (for a contrary opinion, see Shugart 2001). In any case, the
11 choice of voting system is not neutral: in one sense, it corresponds with a
12 conception of political representation while, in another, it determines how
13 the people's will is represented in parliament.

14 The plurality single-seat constituency system (also called the FPTP system)
15 is in some ways the basic electoral model: one individual is elected per
16 constituency and this is the person who receives the greatest number of valid
17 votes cast in her or his favour. The elector is granted only one vote and goes
18 to the polls only once (a one-round system). This system is used in many
19 countries, including Bangladesh, Canada, Great Britain, India, Malawi,
20 Malaysia, Sudan, Uganda, and the United States. Plurality voting may also
21 occur in multimember electoral districts (this is called the block vote [BV]).
22 In this case, the elector is granted as many votes as there are seats to be filled,³
23 and the winners are the candidates who receive the greatest numbers of votes
24 in their favour in each electoral district. This formula is used in countries
25 including Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritius,
26 Palestine, Tonga, and Tuvalu. The BV can also be implemented at the party
27 level (as in Djibouti): the elector receives one vote to choose a party (not can-
28 didates) and the political party that receives the most votes wins all of the
29 seats in the district. This is called the party block vote (PBV).

30 Some countries with majoritarian systems require an absolute majority (at
31 least 50 percent plus one) of the valid votes cast in a district in order for a can-
32 didate to be declared the winner. At least two formulas exist. The first, the TRS,
33 involves summoning the electorate to a second election if no absolute major-
34 ity is obtained by any candidate in the first round. In the second round, one of
35 two processes is used: the two candidates who received the most votes during
36 the first election run against each other, the winner being the one who receives
37 the absolute majority of valid votes cast (this, the runoff election, is the
38 method used for presidential elections in France); alternatively, a few candi-
39 dates selected according to the electoral rules compete again, the winner being
40 the one who receives the most votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority
41 (this process is used for the legislative elections in France and Hungary).
42 The second absolute majority formula, the AV, asks the elector to rank

1 candidates in order of preference. Once the first-preference votes are tallied, if
2 no candidate has received an absolute majority of the valid votes cast, the
3 second-choice votes for the least popular candidate are redistributed among
4 the other candidates; this is repeated until one of them achieves an absolute
5 majority. The election of the members of the House of Representatives in
6 Australia is carried out in this fashion. Fiji and Papua New Guinea also use the
7 AV. Except for the PBV, all plurality/majority systems require the elector to vote
8 for one or more candidates and not for political parties.

9 Proportional representation is an attempt to match the proportion of seats
10 assigned to a political party in the legislative assembly to the proportion of the
11 valid votes cast for that party. Essentially, there are two types of proportional
12 systems: STV—also called the Hare system, after its inventor, Thomas Hare—
13 and the list proportional representation system (list PR). Under STV, the voter
14 must rank all or some of the candidates whose names appear on the ballot in
15 decreasing order of preference. In other words, the elector marks “1” on the
16 ballot next to her or his favourite candidate, then, if required to do so, a “2”
17 next to her or his second-choice candidate, and so on. This is typically a vote
18 for an individual and not a party (although the party option is available for
19 the Australian Senate and is used by more than 95 percent of electors). An
20 electoral quota is established,⁴ which determines the minimum number of
21 valid votes required for a seat in the assembly. The ballot count initially con-
22 siders each candidate’s first-preference votes, and those who reach the quota
23 are elected. If the first count does not fill all of the seats, additional counts are
24 held that consider and allocate three types of votes: the first preference votes
25 assigned to unelected candidates; the next preferences (second, third, fourth
26 place votes, etc.) of ballots that gave higher preference to candidates already
27 elected; and, finally, the next preferences of ballots that gave higher preference
28 to any candidate eliminated because she or he received the lowest number of
29 votes in a given round⁵ (for an excellent description of the STV calculation
30 process, see Farrell 2001: 121–152; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b: 593–596).
31 This procedure continues until all the seats are assigned. Ireland and Malta
32 used the STV, as does the Australian Senate.

33 List PR is the most common procedure used in proportional representa-
34 tion systems. In this procedure a country is either designated as a single elec-
35 toral district (Israel and the Netherlands) or divided into several
36 multimember districts. On polling day, the voter selects one of the lists cre-
37 ated by the political parties in the race (as in Costa Rica and South Africa) or
38 one or more candidates whose names appear on the lists (as in Brazil, Finland,
39 and Indonesia). In other words, the lists may be open (vote for a candidate) or
40 closed (vote for a party), so that the voter may or may not have the option
41 of changing the order of names determined by the parties.⁶ Seats are
42 assigned to political parties according to various procedures (there are two

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1 main categories of electoral formula, the highest average method and the
2 largest remainders method⁷) and then to candidates according to their ranking
3 on the list.⁸ To avoid proliferation of parties represented in parliament, list
4 PR systems usually impose a threshold for representation. This threshold is
5 the minimum proportion of valid votes required for a political party to win a
6 seat in parliament (for instance, 5 percent of the national vote in Germany).
7 A wide array of countries in all regions (with the exception of Oceania and
8 the Pacific islands) use the list PR system.

9 Apart from plurality/majority and PR systems, a third variety of voting system
10 has recently gained popularity in the electoral sphere: the mixed system.
11 Bolivia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand,
12 Russia, Senegal, and Venezuela are among the countries that use the Mixed-
13 Member System. Essentially, this hybrid electoral formula pursues two ideals:
14 stable effective government (a characteristic of the majority governments typically
15 formed in plurality/majority systems) and sociodemographic representation
16 in parliament (a characteristic of PR). The typical MM System operates
17 as follows: one portion of the seats in the legislative assembly is allotted by plurality/
18 majority representation (usually FPTP) and the other portion by the PR
19 system (usually by list PR in multimember districts). The voter has two ballot
20 papers, one for the majoritarian tier and the other for the PR tier, in order to
21 elect representatives who will sit in the same legislative assembly.

22 In terms of the plurality/majority tier, usually the candidate who receives
23 a simple plurality of the valid votes cast in her or his district is declared the
24 winner after only one round. This is the case in Mexico, New Zealand, and
25 Thailand, for example. Sometimes, however, the requirements are more
26 demanding and the election continues into a second round, in which the
27 candidate who receives the absolute majority (in a runoff, as in Georgia) or
28 a plurality (as in Hungary) is elected. While the PR tier is most often in lists
29 (usually closed), sometimes there are no lists, and the seats are assigned by
30 the parties to their highest-polling unsuccessful candidates, or “best losers”
31 in the majoritarian tier. This list may be national (as in New Zealand) or by
32 electoral district (as in Mexico).

33 While MM systems combine the principles of majority and proportional
34 representation to elect the members of the legislative assembly, the assigning of
35 seats may or may not take into consideration the interaction of these principles.
36 Mixed-Member systems are known as compensatory when the distribution of
37 seats in one tier (usually the proportional tier) depends on the parties’ gains in
38 the other tier (usually the majoritarian one). This is the case in Bolivia,
39 Germany, New Zealand, and Venezuela. MM systems in which the distribution
40 of seats in both tiers is carried out in an independent manner are known as
41 parallel. This is the case, for example, in Armenia, Japan, Monaco, Russia, and
42 Ukraine. These two approaches result in different distributions of seats in the

1 assembly: the compensatory method favours the proportional principle, while
2 the parallel method favours the majority principle. Usually, a party must win a
3 minimum proportion of the valid votes cast to participate in the distribution of
4 seats in the PR tier. Although this threshold is generally set at 4–5 percent on a
5 national scale (such as in New Zealand, where the threshold is 5 percent unless
6 a party has won one constituency member), it ranges greatly across countries.
7 If the threshold is too low the government’s efficiency could be endangered, and
8 if the threshold is too high “wasted votes” will accumulate, depriving large seg-
9 ments of the electorate of legislative representation. The selection of an electoral
10 threshold does not adhere to strict norms but is rather determined on a case-
11 by-case basis (Lijphart 1994: 149). Another form of the mixed system provides
12 for any party to participate in the distribution of seats in the PR tier as long as
13 the party achieves the election of a certain minimum number of candidates
14 to the majoritarian tier, notwithstanding the level of electoral support earned
15 on the national level. This is the case in Germany (where the minimum is three
16 candidates) and in New Zealand (where the minimum is one). This is, however,
17 only a brief overview: electoral engineers have developed an extensive range of
18 principles and procedures to ensure that their creations will thrive (see Ferrara,
19 Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a).

20 In short, there is a large range of mechanisms through which the people
21 select their parliamentary elite. This spectrum can be organized into three
22 main categories: plurality/majority systems, PR systems, and MM systems.
23 As previously mentioned, each electoral system is based on a conception of
24 political representation, which is expressed in the actual makeup of the parli-
25 ammentary assemblies. Thus, analysis of the proportion of women parlia-
26 mentarians in 88 free countries in 2005, based on the Freedom House’s
27 Gastil index, reveals that the average proportion of lower-or single-house
28 representatives who are women is 10.8 percent in plurality/majority systems,
29 17.7 percent in MM systems, and 21.1 percent in PR systems (see also Norris
30 1997a, 2004: 187). In other words, legislative assemblies that are derived
31 from a PR system include proportionally twice as many women as parlia-
32 ments elected through a plurality/majority system.

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Review of the Literature

36 How can we explain the apparently disadvantageous impact of
37 plurality/majority single-seat systems on the election of women? In these vot-
38 ing systems, each political party designates one—and only one—person per
39 electoral district, unlike in list PR systems in which every party nominates
40 several names per district. At the point of candidate selection in a plural-
41 ity/majority single-seat constituency system, the aspiring candidate is assessed
42 as an individual and not as a member of a team (such as a candidate list).

1 Consequently, the local party association selects the aspiring legislator who it
2 perceives to be the median candidate—in other words, the candidate it
3 thinks is the most broadly acceptable to the largest number of voters. Not all
4 candidatures are equally assessed in this process, given that an informal
5 model of the “winning candidate” guides the selectorates (i.e., the small
6 group of local party activists) when making their choice. According to Norris
7 and Lovenduski (1989), this informal model, which they call “homo politicus,”
8 disadvantages women (see also Carroll 1994: 158–159 for the United States;
9 Sineau 2001: 45–56 for France; Studlar and McAllister 1991 for Australia;
10 Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005: 37, 61, more generally).

11 While PR systems are generally more favourable to the election of women,
12 this pattern is not universal, as illustrated by Inter-Parliamentary Union data
13 collected from over 190 countries. Analysis of those countries ranked highest
14 for the proportion of women in lower or single houses reveals that, although
15 most countries with at least 25 percent women parliamentarians have a PR
16 system, many countries that fall below this level also use PR systems to elect
17 their parliamentarians. This is the case, for example, in Chile (where, inci-
18 dentally, many political parties use quotas), Colombia, Israel, Poland, and
19 Portugal, among others. In terms of STV, Galligan (2005; see also Engstrom
20 1987; Rule 1996) argues that this system does not favour women’s access to
21 the Irish Dail. Others argue that, in fact, list PR is the method most likely to
22 contribute to the election of women to parliaments, because parties benefit
23 from offering their electorate lists that are sociodemographically and ideo-
24 logically diverse (Matland 2003; Norris 1987: 129).

25 Other elements of PR systems also support the election of women. The
26 threshold of representation is the most powerful tool with which voting pro-
27 cedures can influence proportionality (Lijphart 1994: 139). When set at a rel-
28 atively high level, the threshold reduces the number of parties between which
29 parliamentary seats are shared, giving each party more seats. Parties can
30 therefore assign more seats to women, whether voluntarily (i.e., to balance its
31 representation) or mechanically (because the number of seats to be filled
32 reaches further down the list to where female candidates are often placed;
33 Mateo Diaz 2005: 87–93; Matland 2003, 2005).⁹ Many studies have shown
34 that district magnitude, the other mechanism responsible for a PR voting
35 system’s degree of proportionality, also influences women’s ability to be
36 elected: the more seats there are to fill in an electoral district—and, especially,
37 the more a party can hope to win—the stronger are women’s chances of
38 entering parliament (Engstrom 1987; Matland 1993; Matland and Brown
39 1992; Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005: 121; Rule 1987; Studlar and Welch 1991).
40 According to Rule and Norris (1992), a district must have seven or more rep-
41 resentatives (with preferential vote) in order to constitute an electoral context
42 that is favourable to women. Moreover, a high proportionality of seats to

1 votes contributes to a higher proportion of women MPs (Farrell 2001:
2 157–159, 166; Norris 1992; but see Caul Kittilson 2006: 127).

3 If several studies find that PR systems produce assemblies with a higher
4 proportion of women than do plurality/majority systems, many also present
5 a more complicated view of the association, too frequently assumed,
6 between PR and a substantial presence of women in parliaments (Beckwith
7 1992; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994: 147; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Mateo
8 Diaz 2005: 51, 81; Norris 1992). Indeed, voting systems do not act inde-
9 pendently of their contexts; how else could we explain parliaments formed
10 through the same voting system that show different proportions of women
11 lawmakers, or the fact that the percentage of women in any given parliament
12 varies across time even if the voting system remains constant? This is the
13 critical perspective subscribed to in the present work. Of course, the intrinsic
14 features of voting systems have the potential to affect the proportion of
15 women parliamentarians. But voting systems interact with a wide array of
16 cultural, socioeconomic, and political factors, creating an entire dynamic
17 that influences the feminization of parliaments.

18 In fact, studies have shown that a range of factors influence women's access
19 to legislative arenas. These factors can be grouped into three broad categories:
20 cultural, socioeconomic, and political. While such categorisation simplifies
21 analysis, these factors actually combine and overlap in influencing women's
22 access to power. They therefore pose a problem in terms of causality: do cul-
23 tural factors precede socioeconomic, and political factors, or is it the opposite?
24 For example, must there first be a culture of gender equality before women in
25 large numbers can access legal careers and achieve economic independence,
26 which are both major advantages in stepping into the political arena? Because
27 such questions remain unresolved, it is probably more instructive to assume
28 that cultural, socioeconomic, and political factors interact to create a dynamic
29 that acts as a global incubator for the election of women.

30 Culture refers to the values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes that underpin
31 a society and its institutions and that animate the population's ways of being,
32 talking, and doing. Religion, education, and views of gender-based social roles
33 are the primary cultural factors identified as determinants of the proportion
34 of women in parliaments. Generally, Protestantism as dominant religion (as
35 opposed to other religions), women's access to university education, and egal-
36 itarian gender roles are variables positively associated with women's access
37 to parliaments (Norris 1985, 1997b; Norris and Inglehart 2001; Nowacki
38 2003; Paxton 1997; Peschard 2003; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987; Saint-Germain
39 1994). Moreover, Inglehart and Norris (2003: 140–141), Mateo Diaz (2005:
40 64), and Paxton and Kunovich (2003) have all shown that culture, especially a
41 conception of equality between women and men, is a more influential variable
42 than voting systems in determining the proportion of women in parliaments.

1 Despite the apparent importance of cultural factors, a quick glance at the
2 Inter-Parliamentary Union data on women in parliaments encourages us to
3 be cautious in analysing the impact of culture—and particularly of tradi-
4 tional or egalitarian conceptions of gender roles—on the feminization of
5 parliament. In terms of the proportion of single or lower-house members
6 who are women, Afghanistan, Burundi, and Rwanda, societies where
7 Catholicism and Islam dominate, are ahead of Australia, France, and Great
8 Britain, societies where the idea of equality between women and men enjoys
9 support from the general public (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 29–48). It
10 must be noted, however, that Afghanistan and Rwanda have constitutional
11 quotas to promote women’s access to parliament, and Burundi uses a system
12 of list PR (with quotas), while Australia, France, and Great Britain all use
13 plurality/majority system known to be less favourable to the election of
14 women. Moreover, the cases of Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Iraq brilliantly
15 demonstrate that institutional strategies (i.e., quotas) can be justified not
16 only in terms of basic justice but also to overcome the hostility of the
17 population toward the political participation of women.

18 Socioeconomic factors shape the conditions that lead women to envision
19 careers in politics. As Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14–15) note, we are talk-
20 ing here about the supply of candidates. One theory is that if there are only
21 a few women in politics, it is because women are underrepresented in the
22 milieus where parties identify and recruit their potential candidates (Darcy,
23 Welch, and Clark 1994: 104–105). An improvement in women’s socioeco-
24 nomic conditions should therefore favour an increase in their presence in
25 parliaments. Variables considered in this category include the type of society
26 (agricultural, industrial, or postindustrial), the Human Development Index,
27 the birth rate, the proportion of women in the labour market, the
28 female/male revenue ratio, the per capita GNP, public expenditure on edu-
29 cation and healthcare, and the urbanization rate. Studies show that the pro-
30 portion of women in parliaments is positively influenced by factors such as
31 participation in the labour market (particularly in specialized employment),
32 a high Human Development Index, a postindustrial society, and a developed
33 welfare state (Matland 1998a, 2005; Moore and Shackman 1996; Norris
34 1985, 1987: 122, 2004: 186; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Reynolds 1999;
35 Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006; Rule 1987, 1988; Siaroff 2000; United
36 Nations Office at Vienna 1992: 30–31).

37 Once again, the data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union suggest
38 that a nuanced approach is required when analyzing the contribution of
39 socioeconomic factors to the parliamentary representation of women:
40 Mozambique (34.8 percent), South Africa (32.8 percent), the Seychelles
41 Islands (29.4 percent), Guyana (29 percent), or even Namibia (26.9 percent),
42 countries devoid of socioeconomic privilege, outdo G8 member countries

1 such as the United Kingdom (19.7 percent), the United States (16.3 percent),
2 France (12.2 percent), and Japan (9.4 percent) when it comes to the feminiza-
3 tion of their parliaments. Again, the unexpectedly higher representation of
4 women in the former group may partly be explained by the presence of quotas
5 (both legislative and party based), measures to which their Western counterparts
6 seem allergic.¹⁰ The influence of socioeconomic factors proves to be very
7 unstable, to the extent that this influence is often crushed under the weight of
8 other variables in multivariate analysis (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 140;
9 Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton 1997).

10 Political factors shape the demand for candidates. More specifically, these
11 factors influence the selection (that is, the choice of which citizens from the
12 “eligible pool” will contest the election) and election of candidates. In terms
13 of women’s representation, political factors belong to two dimensions: the
14 political rights of women and the political regime. The first dimension refers
15 to the political citizenship of women. It is primarily measured by the year
16 women achieved the right to vote in national legislative elections. A large
17 number of studies have demonstrated a connection between this measure and
18 the proportion of women in parliaments (Kenworthy and Malami 1999;
19 Mateo Diaz 2005: 67; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Norris 2004: 186; Siaroff
20 2000; United Nations Office at Vienna 1992: 99). Unfortunately, few variables
21 have been developed to understand the specific mechanisms by which the
22 political rights of women affect the proportion of women in parliaments.
23 However, many aspects of women’s political rights may influence women’s
24 presence in parliaments. These include the year women won the right to run
25 for office in a national election, the year the first woman was elected to par-
26 liament and the year a woman joined government for the first time, whether
27 a woman has already held the position of president or premier, and so on.

28 Unlike the political rights of women, the political regime (the second
29 dimension of political factors discussed here) has received extensive attention
30 from researchers. Here, researchers have drawn on a wide range of variables to
31 explore the impact of the political regime on the proportion of women parlia-
32 mentarians. These variables include the structure of parliament (the number
33 of seats and the maximum term of a legislature), the nature of the legislative
34 career (the “turnover rate” of legislators), the party system (the number of par-
35 ties contesting elections, the number of effective parliamentary parties, the ide-
36 ology of the parties that form the government, how candidates are selected,
37 and so on), and obviously the electoral system itself (the type of voting system,
38 the district magnitude, the nature of the lists—closed, open or free, and so on).
39 Matland (2003) as well as Oakes and Almquist (1993) and Antić (2003)
40 support the idea that the number of seats plays a role in the proportion of
41 women in parliaments. A low turnover rate of MPs has long been identified as
42 an obstacle for women’s access to legislative assemblies (Andersen and

1 Thorson 1984; Darcy and Choike 1986; Schwindt-Bayer 2005). Norris and
2 Inglehart (2001; see also Norris 1992) believe that parliaments where many
3 parties are represented offer female candidates more possibilities to be elected
4 than bipartisan parliaments. Political formations tending toward the Left and
5 Centre on the ideological spectrum offer better possibilities for women wish-
6 ing to obtain a seat in parliament than do Right-tending ones, particularly
7 where parties of the dominant ideological position form the government
8 (Caul 1999, 2001; Caul Kittilson 2006: 60–66; Mateo Diaz 2005: 76; Siaroff
9 2000). If quotas appear to have a direct and immediate impact on the femi-
10 nization of parliaments, it is important to note that many criteria must be
11 present for quotas to achieve their objectives. For example, they must preempt
12 resistance by mandating a gender-sensitive order for classifying candidates on
13 lists and by imposing penalties for offences against the law (Dahlerup 2006a;
14 Htun and Jones 2002; Mateo Diaz 2005: 76–80; Matland 2006; Peschard 2003).

15 The role that parties play in the election of women to parliaments has
16 been the subject of many studies, which is not surprising since they are the
17 true superintendents of the parliamentary representation of women.
18 According to Matland and Montgomery (2003a: 31–32), “The electoral sys-
19 tem directly effects [*sic*] female legislative representation, because it shapes
20 the recruitment strategies of party gatekeepers at the nomination phase.” In
21 other words, the voting system shapes parties’ strategies for selecting candi-
22 dates. This perspective is endorsed by Farrell (2001: 167), who argues that
23 “it is not the electoral system which is at fault [for the underrepresentation
24 of women in parliaments] so much as the party selection committees” (see
25 also Gallagher 2005; Norris, Carty, Erickson, Lovenduski, and Simms 1990).
26 Here, the argument is that the feminization of parliaments depends less on
27 the voting system than on the will of political parties to feminize their par-
28 liamentary ranks, as Maurice Duverger noted in his early work *The Political*
29 *Role of Women*, published more than 50 years ago, in 1955. More recently,
30 Caul Kittilson (2006) has convincingly documented this idea.

31 In almost all electoral systems, it is the parties and not the electorate that
32 control the selection of candidates—and therefore the composition of parlia-
33 ments. However, the nature of the control that the parties exercise over the
34 selection of candidates varies greatly according to the voting procedure and its
35 particular characteristics (Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher and Marsh 1988;
36 see the case studies in Norris 1997c). In terms of proportional representation,
37 closed lists and lists without preferential voting give political parties absolute
38 control over the composition of parliament, as opposed to open lists with pref-
39 erential voting (and *panachage*) in which the voters play a role in designating
40 the people, and not only the parties, who will represent them. There is, how-
41 ever, no consensus as to which list (closed or open) best fosters the election of
42 women (for closed lists, see Htun and Jones 2002; Matland and Montgomery


1 2003a; for open lists, see Caul Kittilson 2006: 106, 116–117, 132; Rule 1994a;
2 Rule and Norris 1992; Rule and Shugart 1995; Schmidt 2003a; Siemierska
3 2003). In the STV system, parties have indirect (in other words, preliminary)
4 control over the composition of parliament: female and male candidates must
5 obtain endorsement from the party for which they are campaigning, but votes
6 for endorsed candidates are preferential votes entrusted by the electorate to the
7 individual. These votes, and not the ranking established by the parties, will
8 therefore determine who will hold a seat in parliament. The few countries that
9 use an STV system (notably Ireland and Malta) show low proportions of
10 women in their parliaments (Galligan 2005; Hirczy 1995; Lane 1995; Rule
11 1996).¹¹ As for plurality/majority representation, the American system of pri-
12 maries does not confer any power on the parties to select candidates for
13 Congress, while the Australian and British¹² parties firmly hold the reins of the
14 candidate selection process. Women may benefit from having a standardized
15 and centralized selection process, as this would allow national elites to more
16 easily adopt positive affirmative measures and quotas (Caul 1999; Matland and
17 Studlar 1996; Norris 1992; Randall 1982: 141–142). Furthermore, a standard-
18 ized and centralized process of selection enables the women’s movement to
19 more easily pressure political parties to select women as candidates.

20 Many studies have brought to light how important it is for the women’s
21 movement to mobilize in the electoral sphere if the number of women parlia-
22 mentarians is to increase (see the case studies in Lovenduski et al. 2005). As
23 Matland (2003) notes, any group that aspires to parliamentary representation
24 must mobilize in the electoral sphere. This is especially crucial “for those groups
25 that are important within the parties, but are not at the centre of power”
26 (p. 333). Rule (1987) goes so far as to argue that this kind of mobilization can
27 be a counterweight to the resistance of certain voting systems to the election of
28 women: “Negative electoral system features have been overcome by women’s
29 political mobilization” (p. 495). Caul (1999; see also Caul Kittilson 2006: 60–66)
30 has shown that the mobilization of women within party structures can have
31 positive effects on the legislative representation of women, although Tremblay
32 and Pelletier (2001) document a less straightforward relationship. Outside of
33 parties, Paxton, Hughes and Green (2006) have revealed that the mobilization
34 of the women’s movement on the international scene and global pressure
35 in favour of women’s access to political representation are important variables
36 in explaining the growing feminization of legislative arenas around the world.

37
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Analytical Framework

40 From the literature review presented here, the following analytical
41 framework emerges. Figure 0.1 presents the analytical framework that guides
42 each of the contributors in their case studies in this book. Its objective is



19
20 **Figure 0.1** The global dynamic influencing the proportion of women in national
21 parliaments

22
23 twofold: first, to schematize and summarize the dynamic created by the
24 many factors that influence the percentage of women in parliaments; and,
25 second, to emphasize the central role that electoral systems play in this
26 dynamic (a role widely recognized in previous studies) while also consider-
27 ing the contribution of political parties and sex quotas. Thus, the analytical
28 framework postulates that the presence of women in parliaments is not the
29 product of one isolated variable—not even such an influential variable as the
30 voting system. Electoral systems do not act in isolation; instead, they interact
31 with a host of cultural, socioeconomic, and political variables to create a
32 global dynamic that in turn influences the proportion of women in legisla-
33 tive assemblies.

34 In more technical terms:

- 35
36
- 37 • the dependent variable (or the phenomenon to be explained) is the
38 proportion of women legislators;
 - 39 • the independent (or explanatory) variables refer to cultural, socioeco-
40 nomic and political factors. These three groups of factors are taken
41 from the literature review given earlier. Cultural factors include, among
42 others, the female literacy rate; the proportion of women enrolled in
tertiary education; gender role values (traditional or egalitarian); and

1 religion. Socioeconomic factors include, for example, the Human
2 Development Index; the gender empowerment index; the fertility rate;
3 gross domestic product per capita; the level of poverty; the rate of
4 female economic activity rate as a percentage of the male rate; the ratio
5 of female to male earned income; the percentage of all professional and
6 technical workers who are female; the urban population as a percent-
7 age of the whole; the level of public expenditure on education and
8 health; and so on. Political factors refer to both the state framework of
9 governance and the achievements of women in politics. The former
10 encompasses indicators such as the structure of the state (unitary or
11 federal); the structure of the national legislature (e.g., the number of
12 houses, the maximum term of the legislature, and the number of seats
13 in the lower or single house); the party system (e.g., the effective num-
14 ber of electoral and parliamentary parties); the conditions of candi-
15 dacy (whether a monetary deposit is required for candidacies; whether
16 candidates' campaign costs are subsidized); and electoral turnout.
17 Variables referring to the political achievements of women include the
18 year women secured the right to vote and to stand for national
19 elections; the year the first woman was elected to the lower or single
20 house; and whether there has ever been a woman head of state (as
21 president) or chief of government (as prime minister).

22
23 This analytical framework preserves a place for the electoral system that
24 recognizes its special status, as established by the broad consensus emerging
25 from studies that have examined the impact of this variable on the percent-
26 age of women legislators. This special status is conveyed by the central posi-
27 tion occupied by the electoral system in the model, presented, as it is, in the
28 middle of the constellation of independent variables. This preponderant
29 influence on the feminization of parliaments is expressed by the extending
30 dotted line that indicates the dependent variable. This line is also intended
31 to convey the fact that, although the voting system exercises a major influ-
32 ence on the feminization of parliament, this role is not divorced from the
33 wider societal context in which it is anchored. In this perspective, the
34 analytical framework highlights the contribution of two variables
35 intimately connected to voting systems that also exercise an influence on the
36 number of women parliamentarians: political parties and sex quotas.
37 These variables appear as dotted lines adjacent to the voting system, in
38 order to express the relationships through which they are intimately related.
39 Thus, the proportion of women in parliaments ought to be seen as an inter-
40 active function of electoral systems, political parties, and sex quotas as well
41 as a host of cultural, socioeconomic, and political variables. In addition,
42 electoral systems in themselves constitute a very complex universe; their

1 impact on the election of women depends on their specifics (such as the
2 level of proportionality, the number of electoral districts, district magnitude,
3 whether the party list is closed or open, the electoral threshold, the electoral
4 formula—d’Hondt, Hare, or St. Laguë, etc.), and so on. For example, electoral
5 rules that favour a high party magnitude are likely to assist in the election
6 of women. Therein lies a major contribution of this work: its focus on these
7 details of electoral systems in order to identify which ones influence the
8 election of women, and how. Finally, the dotted circle around “electoral
9 systems” indicates that this variable is not only immersed in a wider context
10 of cultural, socioeconomic, and political variables, but that these variables
11 and the voting system interact to create an overall dynamic that affects the
12 access of women to parliaments. The solid lines connecting the circle cre-
13 ated by all the independent variables to the dependent variable illustrate
14 this holistic effect.

15 This, therefore, is the general analytical framework that I proposed to the
16 contributors of this book. The model entails qualitative rather than
17 quantitative analysis; it does not intend to establish statistical relationships
18 between variables. The strength of this analytical framework is its flexibility.
19 In theory, it includes the whole range of independent variables that influence
20 the proportion of women in parliaments. However, not all of these variables
21 are relevant in every case study. For example, the female literacy rate is cer-
22 tainly not a significant variable in explaining the level of feminization of the
23 French Assemblée nationale or the British House of Commons. It was left to
24 contributors, based on their own electoral expertise and in-depth knowledge
25 of the country they were studying, to draw from this analytical framework
26 the variables they judged to be relevant to their case study. However, one
27 variable, the voting system, was included in every study, given the purpose of
28 the book and the central place that this variable occupies in the analytical
29 framework. Consequently, the case studies presented in this book do not sys-
30 tematically use the same independent variables; all, however, take the voting
31 system (as well as political parties and sex quotas) into account. In sum, the
32 analytical framework designed for this book provides a flexible approach to
33 discovering how a dynamic constituted by an array of cultural, socioeco-
34 nomic, and political variables, dominated by the voting system, determines
35 the percentage of female parliamentarians.

36
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Case Studies and Structure of the Chapters

39 This book analyzes the impact of voting systems on women’s legislative rep-
40 resentation in 15 countries whose systems are divided between the three
41 aforementioned electoral families: plurality/majority systems, PR systems,
42 and mixed systems. Each electoral family takes up a section of the book.

1 Four criteria were used in the selection of countries for inclusion in this
2 book. The first criterion applied was the type of electoral system: it was
3 important to cover the broadest possible spectrum of voting systems. Thus,
4 the majoritarian systems covered are: First-Past-the-Post, Single
5 Nontransferable Vote, Second Ballot, and Alternative Vote. The section on PR
6 systems includes case studies of Closed Lists, Preferential [Open] List, and
7 Single Transferable Vote systems. Finally, the cases of Mixed-Member systems
8 were selected to represent Mixed-Member Proportional, Majoritarian, and
9 Majoritarian with Partial Compensation. The second criterion was that of
10 geographic diversity. Since the issue of women's presence in parliaments is
11 now on the international agenda, and in order to free the book from the
12 restrictive Western and Northern perspective to which too many works are
13 confined, it was important to ensure a broad representation of countries
14 across all continents. The third criterion, intimately connected to the preced-
15 ing one, was to ensure that the countries selected reflected cultural, socioeco-
16 nomic, and political diversity. Finally, the fourth criterion is that countries
17 were selected to include several typical cases. For example, Ireland is one of
18 the rare countries that uses STV and Afghanistan SNTV; Mexico has sex
19 quotas that apply to the PR tier, of course, but also to the constituency tier,
20 which is quite unique. The remainder of this section lays out the rationale
21 under which each country was selected.

22 The section on majoritarian systems discusses six countries. In the first
23 group of countries are the plurality systems, some of which use single-seat
24 constituencies (Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
25 America), while others use multimember districts (Afghanistan, where the
26 SNTV is in effect). In the other group are the majority systems, used in
27 France (the TRS) and Australia (where the members of the House of
28 Representatives are elected by the AV). Spread across several continents, the
29 countries covered in this section exhibit a wide range of cultural conditions
30 (for example, varying attitudes to gender equality and materialist/postmate-
31 rialist values) and socioeconomic positions (for instance, Afghanistan has an
32 agricultural economy while four other of the countries are G8 members).
33 Some countries are well-established democracies while others are developing
34 democracies. In addition, four of these countries (Afghanistan, France,
35 Uganda, and the United Kingdom) have specific mechanisms in place to
36 encourage the election of women to parliament. As of February 2007,
37 the proportion of women parliamentarians varies between 12.2 percent
38 (France) and 29.8 percent (Uganda).

39 Each of these countries also has particular characteristics that warrant
40 closer study as part of this book. Uganda has a reserved seats policy for
41 women. In the United Kingdom, after the Labour Party's all-women short-
42 lists policy was deemed discriminatory, the Labour government brought in

1 legislation permitting positive discrimination in the selection of parliamen-
2 tary candidates. The United States uses an electoral system with several char-
3 acteristics judged to be negative for the election of women, such as a very
4 strong two-party system and a low turnover rate of representatives.
5 Afghanistan and Australia use the SNTV and the AV, respectively, voting sys-
6 tems that are little seen elsewhere in the world. Finally, France has adopted a
7 law on female/male parity in political representation (requiring a 50/50
8 quota of candidates), which has had extremely disappointing results in fem-
9 inizing the *Assemblée nationale*.

10 The five case studies in the second section of the book—PR cases—are
11 divided into two categories: first, closed-list PR voting systems (two
12 countries), and second, preferential (open) list PR systems and STV (three
13 countries). The countries using the closed-list PR can be found on two con-
14 tinents and offer significant cultural, socioeconomic, and political diversity.
15 Both are equipped with specific measures to increase the proportion of
16 women parliamentarians (i.e., party quotas), which explains in part—but
17 only in part, as shown by many chapters in this book—their high
18 proportions of women legislators (between 32.8 percent and 36 percent).
19 South Africa clearly illustrates the important role played by the mobilization
20 of the women’s movement in securing the presence of women in the legisla-
21 tive institutions of a new regime. And, as in South Africa, the progress made
22 in Spain shows what a sympathetic political party can accomplish for the
23 legislative representation of women.

24 Countries using preferential (open) list PR voting systems and STV can
25 be found in South America and Europe. Two of the countries covered in this
26 section are long-standing democracies while the other is a more recent one.
27 In this group, which is also made up of very culturally, socioeconomically,
28 and politically diverse countries, the proportion of women parliamentarians
29 (varying between 13.3 percent and 34.7 percent) is generally more modest
30 than in the closed-list PR voting systems group. Ireland and Peru are inter-
31 esting for reason of their use of open lists. More specifically, Ireland is an
32 important case because of its STV system, the effects of which on the pro-
33 portion of women in parliaments remain little understood. Belgium is
34 equipped with a legal quota to increase the proportion of women parlia-
35 mentarians, but it also seems that the feminization of the lower house has
36 been affected by other unexpected developments within voting system itself.

37 The third and final section of the book deals with Mixed-Member systems.
38 Two countries (Mexico and New Zealand) belong to the MMP voting systems
39 category, one (Japan) to the MMM systems category, and one (Hungary)
40 is considered to be in the MMM system category with partial compensation
41 (using votes instead of seats to link the tiers and make the proportion of
42 seats held by a party in parliament reflects the proportion of votes received

1 by that party; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005: 23). Spread across four
2 continents, the countries in this last section also show great cultural,
3 socioeconomic and political diversity. The proportion of women legislators
4 varies between 9.4 percent and 32.2 percent. Only two of the countries in this
5 section (Hungary and Mexico) have measures designed to improve the
6 proportion of women in parliament. Mexico is particularly significant as its
7 legal quota for women in politics is a unique case in North America. The
8 electoral system change that New Zealand has experienced from 1993 to
9 1996 renders this country an unavoidable case in any study of women's
10 representation and voting systems. In addition, in New Zealand, the MMP
11 system has not assisted the legislative representation of women as much as
12 certain theoretical analyses had promised. Hungary has one of the most
13 complex voting systems in the world, making it important to analyse the
14 effects of this system on women's access to the Orszaggyules. Finally, the case
15 of Japan illustrates the importance (maybe even the precedence) of cultural
16 variables over socioeconomic and political factors in understanding the
17 proportion of women in parliaments.

18 Analysis of each of the countries examined in this work shares a common
19 format of four sections, in addition to the introductions and conclusions:

- 20
- 21 • *Description of the voting system:* The objective of this section is to
22 describe the voting system used to elect members to the lower or single
23 house of the national parliament. In each chapter this section is
24 intended to outline the rules of the electoral game through which
25 women are elected to parliament;
 - 26 • *Analysis of the evolution of the proportion of women legislators:* The sec-
27 ond section, which deals with the dependent variable in the analytical
28 model underpinning this work, is intended to sketch out the evolution
29 of women's presence in the lower or single house of each national par-
30 liament since World War II. In doing so, these accounts demonstrate
31 that countries with similar voting systems can have very different pro-
32 portions of women parliamentarians;
 - 33 • *Analysis of the impact of the voting system on women's legislative repre-
34 sentation:* This section is intended to identify how the voting system
35 influences the proportion of women in the lower or single house of the
36 national parliament. The voting system is the variable at the heart of
37 the analytical framework that guides this book. These analyses scruti-
38 nize the various characteristics of each voting system that might
39 explain the proportion of women parliamentarians;
 - 40 • *Analysis of other variables that might influence the percentage of women
41 in legislature:* The last section of each chapter elucidates the funda-
42 mental idea on which this work is based: that voting systems do not act

1 mechanically or in isolation to determine the proportion of women in
2 parliaments. Rather, their effects combine with the effects of a range of
3 societal factors acting together. As previously shown, the research
4 results carried out to date on the determining factors in the election of
5 women help to separate these factors into three broad categories: cul-
6 tural, socioeconomic, and political (the political rights of women and
7 the political regime).
8

9 *Women and Legislative Representation* is an important contribution in
10 the field of electoral studies as well as gender/women's studies for several
11 reasons. First, since the 1990s, under the momentum created by several
12 events (such as the adoption of the Beijing Platform in 1995), and respond-
13 ing to pressure from several international and regional organizations (such
14 as the United Nations and the Southern African Development Community)
15 as well as women's movements, many countries have adopted new electoral
16 rules to satisfy the requirements of representative democracy, while others
17 thoroughly revisited their electoral systems. One of the objectives sought by
18 these reforms was to establish parliaments that reflected more closely the
19 profile of the community. In this context, there was a call for an increased
20 presence of women in parliaments. Hence, this book seeks to understand a
21 profound political shift, that of the democratization of political regimes,
22 through the particular perspective of female representation in parliaments.
23 In addition, this book provides those who are interested in constitutional
24 and electoral design the tools they need to understand key features of vot-
25 ing systems and the potential impact of these on women's access to parlia-
26 mentary representation. The other volumes currently available on
27 constitutional and electoral engineering either completely ignore the repre-
28 sentation of women or discuss women in a "sociodemographic representa-
29 tion in parliament" section, implying that women (half of the human
30 species) are just a minority group.

31 Second, this book is important because it evaluates the idea that PR sys-
32 tems are women-friendly. Too frequently, studies present this idea as an
33 authoritative argument, thus obscuring the fact that many countries with PR
34 systems have low proportions of female legislators. This idea has become a
35 kind of dogma that is unthinkingly repeated to explain the level of women's
36 legislative representation, in a similar way to that in which critical mass is pre-
37 sented as a precursor to the substantive representation of women. The latter
38 idea, however, is increasingly questioned (see the "Critical Perspectives on
39 Gender and Politics" section in *Politics & Gender*, December 2006). This book
40 calls for a more nuanced approach to the contribution of PR systems to the
41 feminization of parliaments and sheds light on the particular characteristics
42 of PR that are most likely to render parliaments women friendly.

1 Third, this book is important because it revisits the questions considered
2 by *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and*
3 *Minorities* (Westport, Connecticut: Westview Press), edited by Wilma Rule
4 and Joseph F. Zimmerman in 1994. Rule and Zimmerman's text is an author-
5 itative work on the impact of voting systems on the presence of women in
6 parliaments. Considering the speed and complexity of the changes brought
7 about by electoral engineering in the last ten years, however, *Electoral Systems*
8 *in Comparative Perspective* is now outdated and, until now, no other text has
9 sought to replace it.

10 Although many articles have been published in scholarly journals on the
11 factors influencing women's access to parliamentary representation, unlike
12 those articles the chapters included here share a common analytical frame-
13 work. Herein lies one of the original contributions of this work. The study of
14 different cases using a common analytical framework allows for parameters
15 that promote consistency in analysis from one case to another. Another orig-
16 inal contribution of *Women and Legislative Representation* is that it consid-
17 ers countries on all continents that are very diverse in cultural, economic,
18 and political terms. Too often, comparative works concentrate on Northern
19 and Western countries, neglecting Southern and Eastern ones. The sad con-
20 sequence of this narrow perspective is that initiatives undertaken in these
21 Southern or Eastern areas to increase the proportion of women in parlia-
22 ment have too often escaped the attention of Western readers.

23 One final word: *Women and Legislative Representation* acknowledges the
24 remarkable work of Professor Wilma Rule, a pioneer and a dedicated scholar in
25 the field of "women and electoral systems." For several years, she was the only
26 specialist to study the impact of voting systems on women's legislative repre-
27 sentation. Today, her work is highly respected by scholars of electoral reform.
28 Professor Rule left us in January 2004. This book is dedicated to her memory.

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30
31

Notes

32 * I wish to thank Gretchen Bauer and Sarah Childs for their helpful comments. I would
33 also like to thank Merrindahl Andrew (Australian National University) for her
34 linguistic assistance.

- 35
- 36 1. See www.ipu.org/wmn-f/world.htm; accessed February 14, 2007.
 - 37 2. In the Introduction and Conclusion, the terms "voting system" and "electoral
38 system" are used interchangeably.
 - 39 3. If the voter can use all of her or his votes for a single candidate, it is called a cumu-
40 lative vote. For an argument in favour of this system, see Guinier (1991). It is possi-
41 ble for the voter to be given fewer votes than there are seats to be filled. This voting
42 system, used in Gibraltar, is called the limited vote. It is also possible for each elec-
tor to receive only one vote in a multimember electoral district. This voting system,

- 1 called the Single Nontransferable Vote, has been adopted in Afghanistan and was
2 used in the Japanese House of Representatives from 1947 to 1993.
- 3 4. According to the LR-Droop quota.
- 4 5. STV elections are largely, but not exclusively, determined by first preference votes,
5 depending on whether subsequent rounds of counting are required. A variant of
6 the STV system is STV with Borda elimination, which weights the voters' complete
7 and initial rankings; see Geller 2005.
- 8 6. Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2005: 84, 90) also mention free lists, used in
9 Luxembourg and Switzerland. This is a preferential vote because the voter may
10 change, in several ways, the list that a party submits—by entering a candidate's
11 name more than once, by crossing out some names, and even by adding the
12 names of candidates from other parties to that party's list.
- 13 7. The highest average method allocates seats sequentially: the number of votes a
14 party won is divided by a sequence of divisors. Varieties include the d'Hondt sys-
15 tem (the sequence of divisors is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.), the Sainte-Laguë formula (1, 3,
16 5, 7, etc.), the modified Sainte-Laguë formula (1.4, 3, 5, 7, etc.), the Imperiali
17 method (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, etc.), and the Danish method (1, 4, 7, 10, etc.). The largest
18 remainders method calculates a quota (Q) based on the numbers of votes cast (V)
19 and the number of seats to be allocated (S). There are various formulae: the Hare
20 quota ($Q=V/S$), the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota ($Q=V/(S+1)$), the Droop quota
21 ($Q=V/(S+1)+1$), and the LR-Imperiali quota ($Q=V/(S+2)$).
- 22 8. It is possible, as in Finland, for the number of seats assigned to a political
23 party to be determined by the sum of votes received by candidates on an indi-
24 vidual basis. The elector is then voting for a candidate and not a party (Raunio
25 2005; Taagepera 1994).
- 26 9. The opposite effect can also be argued: a low threshold of representation favours the
27 parliamentary representation of small parties for which women are often candi-
28 dates. However, this argument suffers from an important weakness: since small par-
29 ties achieve only a few seats each, it is likely that these seats will be given to men, as
30 men are more likely to be the party leaders and thus at the top of each list.
- 31 10. France is an exception, where both voluntary (for the plurality/majority elec-
32 tions) and compulsory (for List PR elections) measures encourage parties to
33 present an equal number of female and male candidates in legislative elections
34 (see Scott 2005: 124–146), as in Great Britain, where, in 2002, legislation was
35 passed to give political parties who adopted such measures protection from
36 antidiscrimination law (see Childs 2004: 204–211).
- 37 11. However, STV is not associated with low women's representation in the seven
38 legislative chambers using it in Australia. In addition, the Australian Senate,
39 which has used STV since 1949, has always had a higher proportion of women
40 than the House of Representatives (which uses the majoritarian Alternative
41 Vote). I thank Marian Sawyer for her comment on this point.
- 42 12. However, it should be mentioned that the Conservatives used primaries in a few
instances in 2005 and hope to have more next time around. I thank Sarah Childs
for bringing this to my attention.

QUERY FORM

BOOK TITLE:	WLR-Tremblay
CHAPTER NO:	Introduction

Queries and / or remarks

Query No.	Query / remark	Response
	No Queries.	